What Might Explain Class Segregation In America

In a recent article in the NYT, David Brooks called class-based segregation a scourge.  To be precise he used the phrase class self-segregation by which I suppose he meant classes have willingly chosen to live apart from each other.  The truth, however, is that the upper classes of America have pulled themselves away from the lower class of less educated and blue-collar Americans.

Segregation is nothing new in American society.  Its most persistent form has been built on racial differences.  Even after a series of laws brought down the legality of race-based segregation, it continues to persist by other means.  Race-based segregation in housing is one of the most enduring forms.  Even the New Deal did not correct this.  Between 1934 and 1962 White families were allocated 98% of the government-backed loans.  And after the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, red lining continued to impede the integration of Black and White Americans.

Brooks is correct though to point out that over the past three decades we have seen segregation to also grow across social classes.  It has grown in multiple fronts.  In home location; in health conditions; in educational achievement; in incomes and wealth; and in social mobility.

Housing is a major factor in the divergent lives lower- and upper-class Americans experience. Zoning laws are the most common method used to leave lower-income people out of prized city neighborhoods or suburbs.  By preventing construction of multi-family units, zoning laws limit home supply and reduce home affordability.  In their book Abundance Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson write that compared to its European peers America is a home poor country with much fewer dwellings per 1000 residents than, say, France or Italy.  The inconvenient truth is that some of the most restrictive zoning laws that limit home supply can be found in liberal cities.

So, the lucky ones who happen to live in privileged places enjoy better schools and higher quality public amenities from parks to public safety.  Better schools from pre-K to high school give children of these families a leg up in landing in highly ranked colleges.  That then becomes the ticket to better networking, better-paying jobs, and higher social status. 

Studies have shown the negative effects of growing up in communities with uneven means and opportunities for educational, cultural, and social growth and development.  For example, the college premium in income is 70% in the US versus 40% in European countries.  This is so because less educated Americans end up in jobs that by the working of our economy pay considerably less than jobs requiring a college degree.  In other studies, children coming out of poor places are much more likely to get stuck in a lower income class than children out of better-off communities.  Thus, a kid’s place of residence becomes destiny.  Another study has shown that children that move to a better location achieve a lot more in their adult life relative to children that remain behind.  What has been found to matter the most for social mobility is to live in places along-side successful people that can serve as role models and more importantly as mentors.  If zoning laws or poverty separate you location-wise from these opportunities, you end up behind.

As others have pointed out, Brooks agrees that the interaction of Americans across different classes has declined in various areas, like civic organizations, places of worship, recreation (“bowling alone” is a famous phrase in this relation) and I would add serving in the military after the end of the draft in 1973.  To overcome these realities, Brooks suggest that better-off Americans make an effort to interact more with their less fortunate fellow citizens.  Others have proposed a more radical solution.  A one-year national service in the spirit of Americorps for high school graduates, so that they can become better informed about those who live on the other side of the tracks.

As sensible as these suggestions may sound, I am very skeptical they are likely to come to pass in present-day America.  And I don’t believe the reason is the political polarization we live through now.  Our polarization is rather the symptom if not the result of our segregated living experiences.  At the core of our problem, I see a social ethos which emerged in the 1980s and prioritizes individual financial success over social cohesion and building a common sense of belonging.  This makes the opportunity cost of social integration rather high to those with the ambition to climb the economic and social ladder or maintain their upper class status.

This argument suggests that when a home, beyond being a shelter, becomes an investment asset, creating scarcity is one way to raise its value.  The inadvertent result is the clustering of families by affordability which limits class interaction.  Rich families send their children to private schools and elite colleges not necessarily to keep them away from the children of poor families but because that’s where networking with similarly well-placed families increases social exposure and future professional opportunities.  For a similar reason, interacting and socializing with lower income and status people in civic organizations and places of worship is time taken from hobnobbing with influential people that can open-up opportunities for further economic and social gains.  Adopting a national service program or more drastically the return of the draft also represents an unacceptable opportunity cost to upper class families because it would delay the advancement of their children or even worse put them in the line of fire.

So, what I am arguing here is that in present-day America we are incentivized to live and act in ways that increase the advantages that are consistent with the prioritization of individual financial and social success.  What has receded over the past decades is our appreciation of a more egalitarian society in both rights and responsibilities in favor of what the academic Peter Turchin calls the overproduction of elites.

As long as those of us who are successful and more affluent can afford to separate ourselves from the problems faced by those who bear the brunt of governmental policies or economic developments, we will continue to live separate lives.  When consequences and responsibilities are borne more evenly, then we can start developing a more unified sense of the common good.