Geopolitics and Lessons from The Peloponnesian War

The war of Russia against Ukraine is not just another armed conflict driven by factors that concern only the combatant states.  Instead, it is also a war motivated by the geopolitical rivalry between two powerful camps, that of Russia on one side and the West (America and Europe) on the other, with Ukraine caught in the middle.  Geopolitics, as a reality of international politics, is nothing new and it is often used by powerful states to interfere in the domestic affairs of weaker states, sometimes going as far as to subjugate suspected or unwilling states.   

Debates cast within the geopolitical paradigm regrettably leave out of proper consideration the wishes and rights of the states caught in between.  This is really the dark consequence of geopolitics for states that try to place themselves on the world stage on account of their own political preferences.  A state aligning itself with one or another political or economic system heightens the fear of the left-out power that its rival is gaining ground against it.  This is the essence of the Thucydides Trap that eventually caused the Peloponnesian War between the Athenian alliance on one side and the Spartan coalition on the other.

The Peloponnesian War was one of the earliest geopolitical wars fought between democratic Athens and its allies and oligarchic Sparta and its own allies.  Its history, written by Thucydides, remains one of the most astute studies of great power rivalry, human folly and suffering, and the dire consequences borne by the warring parties.  So, I will try to distill some of the important lessons of this history by resorting to the much-praised work of Yale historian Donald Kagan, the PELOPONNESIAN WAR.  We may find useful parallels between that war and our present state. 

First, geopolitical wars are cast as conflicts of competing political systems.  Pericles, the Athenian commander, left no doubt of this in his Funeral Oration that the war was between a free-thinking and culture-loving democracy and a socially-rigid oligarchic state.  Hence, it was important that democratic Athens prevailed over oligarchic Sparta. 

Thucydides is not fooled, however, by the pronouncement of high-minded ideals.  He argues that at the root of the war we would find economic greed and personal ambition.  Furthermore, he builds a case of failed diplomacy and inability on both sides to demonstrate good faith and read the intentions of their opponent as contributing factors to the war’s duration for 31 destructive years.  Very insightfully, Thucydides tells us that the parties resorted to reason only to craft arguments against accepting compromise on anything that had value to them. 

The lessons of the Peloponnesian War become very poignant when it comes to the function and behavior of democracies when geopolitical interests are defended.  Athenian arrogance and over-confidence in the superiority of its political system turned Athens into a tyrannical hegemon over its allied city-states.  And when it needed to bring some allies back into the fold, Athens did not spare them of brutality.  Melos, Scione and Megara are examples of the inhumanity even a democracy can inflict on its disloyal allies. 

Thucydides also reminds us that democracies are susceptible to the rise of demagogues and populists, like the Athenian politicians Cleon and Alcibiades.  These are the politicians that put democracies at risk, even cause their demise.  Alcibiades, in particular, is a tragic figure because despite being a disciple of Socrates, he emulated neither his teacher’s loyalty to his city (he fled to the Persian court) nor his skepticism when he arrogantly advised the disastrous Athenian expedition against Sicily from which Athens never recovered. 

In geopolitical contests there is usually a third party ready to win after the combatants exhaust each other.  In the case of the Peloponnesian War, it was the Persian King that came to the aid of Sparta by funding the building of its naval force which finally crippled Athenian superiority in the sea.  Today, it is China that expects to benefit from the rivalry of Russia and the West.

What happened once the war was over and Sparta prevailed holds additional insights as to what awaits geopolitical opponents.  The male populations of the main combatants, Athens, Sparta and Corinth, were decimated.  Most of the Peloponnese was turned into an impoverished country.  Trade across the Greek world and beyond declined as societies turned inward and were left with fewer resources.  The classical ideals of Greeks we associate with controlled emotion and serene beauty in arts gave way under the weight of emotional upheaval and the questioning of the old values the war had unleashed.  It’s the same way with us, as we speculate what our own world will look like in the aftermath of the double crises we experience due to the pandemic and the Ukrainian war.

After enjoying the fruits of their victory for some years, the Spartans found themselves unable to sustain their supremacy over allies and foes.  In less than forty years after the war, Sparta was decisively defeated by its old ally Thebes and never was heard again as a powerful state. 

On the other hand, Athens restored its democratic system and in short time it recovered its alliances and prospered as an independent democracy for most of the 4th century.  Is this evidence of the greater enduring power of democracies?  Maybe.  But we cannot take it for granted.  This is how Kagan throws caution into this question: “Athens’ loss . . . was taken as proof of the inadequacy of its political system; . . . Ordinary human mistakes and misfortunes were judged to be the peculiar consequences of democracy.”  China is always ready to judge the democratic West the same way.  If arrogance was what drove Athens into defeat in the hands of an oligarchy, our indolence in cultivating the democratic ethos and inability to achieve social and economic fairness could as well cause us to have a similar fate as we face challenges from alternative political systems.

The geopolitical paradigm gives powerful countries an excuse to rationalize their aggression in order to exercise hegemony over other states.  We know enough from history to resist this temptation.  It is time that we the people across the globe tell our governments to rather turn their interests into our real and present dangers: a fast-deteriorating climate and a threatened ecosystem, as well as the fighting of disease and poverty.

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Author: George Papaioannou

Distinguished Professor Emeritus (Finance), Hofstra University, USA. Author of Underwriting and the New Issues Market. Former Vice Dean, Zarb School of Business, Hofstra University. Board Director, Jovia Financial Federal Credit Union.

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